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ISTRODUCT ION
The European conquest of Southern Rhodesia was such aore than the ’last o f a 
series of invasions' of the central plateau lying between the Zambesi and the 
Limpopo. The f i r s t  eight years o f Rhodes' 'Great Adventure’ saw uneasy 
cohabitation between pioneer and African, punctuated by the invasion and defeat 
of Lobengula's nation and culminating in the decisive European victory o f 1897 
which ended two years of war against the combined forces o f Shona and Idebele 
and consolidated white control o f the area. The period of conquest was followed 
by efforts  to reconstruct African-European relations on a more peaceful, i f  less 
equitable, basis. The conquerors were there to stay, and presented the newly- 
christened 'Rhodesia' as a "white man's country"— a reference primarily to its  
climate, but influenced by the British South Africa Co's need to attract se ttlers  
to o ffset its  mining losses. The Africans' role in a l l  th is was ambiguous, but 
Darwinism was cited— fashionably, i f  somewhat inaccurately— to support the 
demand that Africans should adapt i f  they expected to survive in th is new 
environment.’ They did both* with far greater success than the settlers  
probably anticipated, but at the expense of s ign ificant dislocation and upheaval 
in established po litica l and social institutions. It  was not simply a matter of 
chiefly power waning before the arrogantly assured control o f the BSACo 
bureaucracy nor o f young men taking up opportunities fo r work in white areas 
beyond their ch iefs ' influence. The creation of a new market fo r African produce 
upset established labour patterns, even in rural areasr'^ s e t t le d  by whites, 
while d ifferent value-systems and mores were partly imposed by Europeans, 
partly adopted by Africans, as contact between these groups increased. Gender 
relationships, too, were caught up in th is social upheaval. The ways men and 
women perceived their social roles, the pressures imposed on their sexual 
behaviour and the opportunities provided for defying gender controls were a ll 
shaken up by the changing economic conditions, the imposition o f European 
ideology, and the creation o f new social environments (especially towns and 
compounds) which provided the chance to migrate beyond direct paternal control. 
A "sexual revolution" was under way.
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This "sexual revolution" was not simply an urban phenomenon. One of the most 
important changes was the upheaval in the gender division o f labour in the 
rural areas. Harried men were in a position to control the labour of wives and 
children. Consequently they were well placed to expand crop production to meet 
the European market, using women and children as labourers without providing 
reciprocal help for household tasks, which included the production o f food for 
home consumption. Furthermore, as Africans, particularly in the Shona areas, 
became more deeply involved in the market economy, they gave more time to 
cultivation and trade, using the cash to buy things that would previously have 
been made by the women in the community. Women’s work became increasingly that 
of the agricultural labourer cultivating produce for the market-place.
Moreover, the p o litica l significance of marriage alliances as a means of 
controlling labour and distributing wealth was challenged. Kinship and 
bridewealth obligations had ensured that junior men were subordinate to the
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elders who controlled the lineage's "bride-providing" ca ttle  herds. These 
obligations also maintained the production levels of richer lineages at the 
expense of lineages poor in cattle and therefore poor in wives, who— as 
labourers and procreators—were v ita l to levels of output..
How, however junior men were winning a measure of independence from elders by 
growing surplus crops fo r the market or undertaking waged work. By these means 
a man could by-pass the need to apply for family assistance to obtain a wife 
fo r himself or his son to 6et up as an independent householder or to expand 
production in an existing family. In an attempt to prevent th is threat to their 
authority, lineage heads were forced to tighten their control over women and 
keep them in the rural areas, where men would return to see them, and women's 
labour could be used to benefit the lineages of husbands or fathers. The very 
presence of Europeans as consumers and as employers consequently led to a 
weakening of African po litica l authority, an alteration in the economic position 
o f rural women and a sh ift  in the gender balance within households as men, but 
not women, le f t  at intervals to seek waged work.
Vhile th is p o lit ica l and economic upheaval was challenging the established 
African rulers from below, the new European administration was constructing a 
Hative A ffa irs  Department (HAD) and 'Native Policy' to impose a new order from 
above. The BSACo was forced to improve its  administration a fter a British 
Government enquiry placed much of the blame for the 1896-7 war at the door of 
amateurish and exploitative 'Hative Commissioners', who perceived their role 
primarily in terms of raising labour gangs.® The new bureaucracy established in 
1898 laid down detailed instructions for Hative Commissioners, which, although 
they included token gestures towards indirect rule in paragraph 2, largely 
attempted to transfer the powers and obligations o f the chiefs and headmen into 
the hands o f the IC.'1 This undermining of ch iefly  power was in keeping with 
what Philip Mason terms the "O ffic ia l Doctrine" of integration, which was 
developed and supported by the upper classes represented in the Colonial O ffice 
as well as in the administration of the BSACo. To these people, who were too 
secure to be threatened by African 'advancement' in the shape of economic 
competition, the nurturing of a skilled African working-class, involved both as 
labourers and as consumers in the European economy, held clear advantages. 
Tribalism was seen as a decaying force whose decline should be encouraged, in 
anticipation of the time when Africans would no longer need reserves to protect 
them from too sudden and violent a contact with the white economy and 
customs.E
The policy o f integration included some commitment to the provision of 
hospitals, missions and schools fo r the Africans as part o f the process of 
'c iv ilis in g  the natives'. "C ivilis ing", and the assumption that whites had a 
responsib ility o f trusteeship to enlighten their darker-skinned fellow men, had 
enjoyed a period o f dominance in the mid-nineteenth century, with the r ise  of 
the unholy tr in ity  of 'Commerce, Christianity and C iv ilisa tion '. By the end of 
the century, the divine trust to 'c iv ilis e ' was somewhat less popular6 , with 
Chamberlain's protectionist policies sp littin g  the Tories in England and 
eugenicists gaining a startling popularity with theories of the inherently 
in ferior and 'uncivilisable' nature of non-European races,7The administration 
fe l t  that the c iv ilis in g  task could largely be le ft  in the hands of the missions 
and private charities, Its  own contribution to the ’c iv i l is in g 1 of Africans 
consisted mostly of placing its  fa ith  in the combined e ffec t of taxes and
market forces. lonetheless, the SAD was given a watching b rie f over the 
progress of a ll attempts to establish schools and missions in the African 
areas.51
The BAD its e lf had a sligh tly  ambiguous attitude towards the integration policy. 
On the one hand, its  o fficers were expected to encourage the decline of 
'traditional' authorities. On the other hand, their work became increasingly 
dependent on preserving the African institutions for which they were 
responsible. The reports of the South African la tiv e  A ffa irs  Commission of 
1903-05, which took evidence from Southern Rhodesia, and o f the la t iv e  A ffa irs  
Committee Df 1910 supported the general view of the HAD that there were many 
worthy aspects to African culture which should be encouraged rather than 
repressed, In 1903 the Department relinquished its  labour-raising function to 
the RHLB, thereby losing its  usefulness in the eyes of the settlers  who began 
to see it  more as a 'pro-Hative' organisation inclined to defend Africans 
against settler misrule.
The duties of Hative Commissioners changed in other respects too, The 1898 
Charter had provided only for Magistrates to carry out Judicial functions, and 
the HCs did not o ffic ia lly  have any such functions. The 1909 Board o f Enquiry 
reported that HCs had become desk-bound and that, where they did not also 
double-up as magistrates, their prestige was low. As a response to th is, a 
proclamation issued the following year enabled HCs to try a ll c iv i l  cases where 
Africans only were involved, and criminal cases where the accused was African 
The HCs therefore began to play a major role in the c iv i l  a ffa irs  of Africans. 
Africans themselves did not welcome the HCs’ attempts to take the place of the 
chiefs and headmen, particularly in matters requiring an arbitration hearing, 
such as bridewealth disputes, even though they recognised that i t  was often 
useful to enlist the backing of the State in a c iv i l  dispute. By 1923, the IAD 
was regarded as suspect both by those who supported a policy of integration 
and by those who did not. Missionaries found the Department over-supportive of 
pagan customs, the settlers resented its  interference and the Company thought 
the HCs behaved "like wardens o f  reserves with vested in terests  in keeping the 
Africans as they were”.1 °
The policy of integration was it s e lf  under attack from another quarter. The 
influence of the white farmers and smallworkers was growing throughout this 
period, leading up to the granting of Responsible Government in 1923. These 
settlers complained constantly of labour shortages, and had no desire to see 
Africans maintain the option o f economic independence as cultivators, enabling 
them to withdrav/ their labour from the open job market. On the other hand, the 
prospect of Africans gaining sk ills  and knowledge which would enable them to 
compete with the white artisan class worried the majority of settlers  far more 
than it  disturbed the administrators and other upper class whites. The problem 
was expressed with surprising c la rity  by the Colonial O ffice Journal in its  
review of Maurice Evans' pro-segregationist work, Black and White in South-East 
Africa:
The trouble is, in fact, not that i t  is d ifficu lt  to educate natives, 
or that i t  is  necessary to manufacture any distinguishing method for 
them, but that as fast as they are educated they compete with the 
whites; in other words, i t  is  not that European education fa ils , but 
that i t  succeeds.11
The doctrine Df integration offered very litt le  to Europeans who fe lt threatened^ 
by such competition. It could be U6ed to Justify reducing the areas reserved for; 
Africans, on the grounds that the Africans’ need for protection was 
disappearing, but it  would not lend itse lf to ouch Bore.12 On the whole, the ' 
settlers were keen to 6ee a policy which would oore effectively keep the |
African unskilled but in need of waged work. By 1909, at least one Chartered 
o ffic ia l was talking openly of segregation. P.F.Hone, in his book Southern 
Rhodesia, claimed that a policy of segregation was actually the Company’s 
intention in allocating reserved land for Africans.1® The ca ll for segregation 1 
grew 6lowly throughout this period, drawing its strength from the fact that it ! 
united conflicting European interests regarding 'Eative Policy'. This lesson had I 
already been learned further south where, as John Cell comments:
i
It was remarkably convenient that a ll  of these competing interests 
could be contained, however uneasily, under the umbrella of segreg­
ationist theory.1 *
At f ir s t  the ca ll was simply for a limiting of land, rather than for fu ll-scale  
segregation in permanently reserved areas. Settlers in the 19106 believed that 
reserves permitted 'idleness'.16 However, by 1923, the humanitarians of the '
Aborigine Protection Society had thrown their weight behind settler demands for 
complete segregation.1 e The settlers were worried by African competition—  
sexual as well as economic— in the white areas, while the APS feared that 
Africans might lose their land rights entirely without permanent reserves. A 
segregation policy appeared to provide Africans with the opportunity to "c iv il­
ise themselves" away from white exploitation. But the demand came at a time 
when Africans were already integrated into the European economy and seeking 
assimilation. Segregation— on inadequate reserves— effectively prevented 
assimilation, without allowing Africans the option of withdrawing their labour. 
The development of the African reserves became the responsibility of the FAD, 
who were, at last encouraged to 'preserve' African systems of authority. "Thus 
what had been bom of sympathy became the servant o f fear and repression"11
THE DRIVE TQ REGULATE MARRIAGE.
Segregation suited the Europeans not least because i t  prevented sexual contact 
between the races. One of the p it fa lls  of assimilation policy had been that i t  
appeared to condone such contact, which was not a welcome idea to the ruling 
classes. In an attempt to surmount this problem, the administrators had found 
themselves drawn into a situation—highly distasteful to gentlemen raised in 
the liberal tradition— where they had to pass legislation  covering the 'private' 
sphere of sexual activ ity . Coupled with this, the missions kept insisting that 
something should be done about African marriage customs, which seemed to them 
a barbaric obstacle to true assimilation.
The Administration had had no in it ia l intention o f meddling in the marriage 
arrangements of the Africans. Unlike in the Cape, where a ll African marriage 
customs were banned on the grounds that they were 'contrary to natural justice', 
the Southern Rhodesian Order in Council o f 1898 stated specifica lly  that:
I f in any c iv i l  case between natives a question arises as to the 
effect of a marriage contracted, according to native law or custom, 
by a native in the lifetim e of one or more other wives married to 
him according to native law or custom, the court may treat such a 
marriage as valid for a ll c iv i l  purposes, in so far as polygamous 
marriages are recognised by the said native law or custom.1 e
The Company needed to establish peace and security after the war o f 1896-7. It 
would not help this project to start attacking African marriage, however much 
the missions might press for action. The missionaries were especially, shocked 
by polygyny, while the Company fe lt  that the institution actually checked 
immorality by keeping down the number o f unmarried g ir ls . Moreover, the 
assimilation policy assumed that African traditions would soon die out anyway— 
i f  only because polygyny and bridewealth payments would be too extravagant in a 
capitalist economy.19
However, by 1901 the Company had decided that action should be taken to sa tis fy  
the missions, noting meanwhile the added advantage that marriage legislation  
could be used to encourage African men to undertake waged work. The missions 
had complained that the practice of bridewealth payments bad restricted the 
freedom of choice available to g ir ls , as parents would force a marriage with the 
richest suitor. In response to this, the 1901 Native Marriages Ordinance set 
down a lim it to bridewealth payments (4 head' of cattle  or equivalent; 5 head in 
the case of a ch ie f’s daughter) and instituted a registration procedure at which 
the details of bridewealth payments would be recorded, to prevent excessive 
payments. A heavy criminal sanction was imposed i f  an African claimed, received 
or caused delivery of bridewealth in excess of the lim it. The Company had no 
intention of abolishing the practice altogether. It was, a fter a ll, fundamental 
to the African kinship-based relations o f production, and attempts at abolition 
would be bound to meet with resistance. As a sop to the missions, the measure 
was not effective. Nine years later, the Report o f the Native A ffa irs  Committee 
commented:
This restriction was presumably intended by the Legislature to 
further the object of the enactment giving freedom of choice to g ir ls  
in connection with marriage...the law is frequently evaded; and, as i t  
is obvious that i t  is  practically impossible to control such
recognise bridewealth exchanges which took longer than twelve months to 
complete.
Secondly, the registration device with which the Europeans attempted to control 
African marriage assumed a European model of marriage, as a state- or church- 
sanctioned event, prior to which the couple is  ‘unmarried’ and a fter which i t  is  
'married'. An African equivalent of this 'event' or 'moment o f marriage’ had to 
be identified i f  registration was to be workable as a tool of control. The 1901 
ordinance failed even to attempt this. There is  a clear note o f frustration in 
the words with which Clarkson Tredgold, the attorney-general, introduced a later 
b ill intended to correct the fa ilin gs of 1901:
The ordinance was obscure, and he [Tredgold] did not desire to
attempt to clear matters up by continuously taking cases on appeal to
the Supreme Court tat Capetown].2®
If African marriage had to be dragged into European courts, the Judges needed 
something other than a European precedent of what constitutes a marriage in 
order to deal with the situation. Moreover, the judges were aware that the 
Hative Affairs Committee of 1910 had declared the lobolo-lim itation provisions 
of the 1901 ordinance to be unworkable.2® Ho court enjoys trying to enforce a 
law when enforcement i6 impossible. The Administration fe lt  i t s e l f  to be under 
strong pressure from the Courts to produce a more workable piece of 
legislation, Among other things, the ordinances o f 1912 and 1917 were an 
attempt to meet that demand.
If it  had been only the Courts that needed satisfaction , the task o f the 
legislators following 1901 would have been re la tive ly  straightforward. They were 
also under pressure, however, from a number of other groups, including the 
Hative A ffairs Department. Like the bench, the department was seeking 
clarification. Were the Hative Commissioners simply registering a de facto  
marriage, or were they actually making a marriage in the eyes of the state? The 
refusal of the courts to recognise an unregistered marriage implied the latter, 
yet the wording of the 1901 ordinance implied the former. Again, i t  is  possible 
to detect a note of weary frustration in Tredgold's comment that the ordinance 
was:
so worded that either a man had to register a thing already reg is t­
ered, or there was nothing that he could reg ister.30
That the ordinance created some measure of chaos during its  seventeen years of 
service is indicated by the rushing-through in April 1917 of a piece of leg is ­
lation named the Native Marriages Validation Ordinance. This validated 
marriages improperly registered by "some young clerks and others" in out- 
stations in the absence of HCs. The Legislative Council decided not to te l l  
Africans that these mistakes had occurred as " it  might only lead to a l i t t l e  
unrest".31
The chaos was exacerbated in 1912 when the Administration attempted to ban 
child-pledging in order to sa tis fy  the missionaries and the female labour lobby. 
'Child-pledging' was in fact 'g irl-p ledging ' and involved a form of debt 
rescheduling. Helping a friend from a poorer lineage through a d ifficu lt  period 
by loaning cattle was standard practice. I f  i t  appeared that the friend was not 
going to be able to repay hi6 debt, the creditor could write i t  o f f  against
The passing of the 1912 ordinance marked the f ir s t  tine in Southern Rhodesia 
that a recognised systen of African aarriage was not only declared illega l but 
also aade into a criminal offence . 3 ,3 One effect of thi6 move, which was not 
raised in the debate in the Legislative Council, was to criminalise part of the 
African system of loans and patronage, which must have contributed to the 
destabilising of chiefly power. It is  not clear from the reports of the Chief 
Hative Commissioner whether the Administration was aware of this "side-effect" 
of its legislation, but such a development would have been in line with o ffic ia l 
'Hative Policy* of the period. It is  also interesting that Tredgold played the 
'morality* card in introducing the b i l l  to the settler-dominated Council, rather 
than pointing out the advantages in bringing African women onto the labour 
market — another "side-effect" which would have suited the assimilation policy 
of the Administration.
Whatever the Company and Legislative Council might have hoped that the 
Ordinance would achieve, its actual effect was to create even greater confusion 
regarding African marriage than had been the result of the 1901 Ordinance. 
Moreover, it did this without noticeably producing a decline in the practice of 
child-pledging nor an increase in the number of women presenting themselves on 
the labour market. A major source of confusion was the fact that the ordinance 
did not specifically prohibit child-pledging, but imposed a penalty40 on:
any person who is  a party to the promising or pledging of a native
female in respect of her marriage.
This effectively criminalised any affination agreement leading to marriage, but 
a vaguely-worded exception,"except insofar as authorised by the said [19011 
Ordinance", was intended to exclude ordinary bridewealth arrangements.
This was only the start of the problems. The ordinance did not make clear how 
anyone could te ll when there was a child-pledging arrangement rather than a 
debt rescheduling, or an aspiration regarding a daughter’s future choice. 
Moreover, it  was only i f  the marriage was actually registered that it  could 
become a 'marriage' in European terms, at which point the g ir l  would be of an 
age to speak for herself, and the 'lack of consent' clause of the 1901 Ordinance 
would be sufficient to prevent the marriage. The 1912 Ordinance could hardly be 
used to prevent the match i f  the g ir l  herself wanted it, i f  only because there 
would be no reason to suppose that any earlier pledging took place. In the 
absence of registration, there was no more than cohabitation between the couple, 
about which the Ordinance was silent. To crown a ll this, there was an apparent 
drafting error in the Ordinance's wording, which substituted "or" for "either". 
The effect was to imply that any arrangement which pledged a 'native female' in 
respect of 'valuable consideration', including a wages agreement, would 
constitute a criminal offence. Having picked his way through a ll these 
confusions,4’ Hittlebeeler adds that, in a case in 1916:
the Judge remarked that i f  the clause in point had appeared in a
contract, he would have held it  void for uncertainty.
Clearly, this sloppy piece of leg is la tion  had to go, and in 191V it  was repealed 
along with the other Hative Marriage Ordinances on the Statute book.
The 1917 Hative Marriages Ordinance which replaced the earlier.Ordinances 
dropped the project of prohibiting pledging altogether. Instead it  concentrated
provision of a fe r t i le  woman to his lineage at some later date when a suitabl 
daughter became available for marriage. The woman would not necessarily becojl 
the cred itor's bride. She may have been wanted as a bride fo r another man to] 
whom the creditor had a responsib ility to provide a w ife.32 Either way, the 
woman’s only chance of avoiding th is pre-arranged match was to run away to a| 
man whose family would be prepared to pay su ffic ien t compensation to satisfy] 
the cred itor’s lineage.33
This ’child-pledging’ arrangement was very important in maintaining the 
s tab ility  of kinship-based class systems during times o f hardship, when droug 
or other disasters created a need fo r loans. Wealthy lineage heads and chiefel 
found their patronage powers reinforced by their enhanced a b ility  to provide 
brides for clients. It seems probable that increased d ifferentation  between 
African producers during the early years of the century, as a result of 
d ifferen t a b ilit ie s  to exploit the expanding food market, led to an increase ii] 
child-pledging. In 1910, the Native A ffa irs  Committee noted (with rather a 
cavalier use o f the word 'money*) that:
Cases have frequently  occurred in which children have been so 
pledged in order that money may be raised to discharge debts.3*(my 
emphasis)
Missionaries were appalled at th is practice, and most Europeans found i t  
distasteful.
In addition to the moral dimension, however, there were also demands that 
action be taken against child-pledging from other quarters. The Native 
Commissioners were fed up with having to  deal with a steady flow of 
compensation claims regarding g ir ls  who had run away.35 Moreover, throughout 
th is period there was a stead^d^mandt|ar female labour. G irls were especially 
sought as domestic w o r k e r s , E u r o p e a n  women were thought to be at risk oi 
6exual attack from black male servants. In an attempt to sa tis fy  this demand, 
Native Commissioners proposed that the power of the family heads to dispose of 
young women in marriage should be weakened, in the hope that th is would give 
the g ir ls  the choice of taking up waged domestic labour instead .3e The 1901 
ordinance did not e ffec tive ly  prevent lineage heads from pledging the g ir ls  
under their control. The nearest i t  came to this was the setting-down of the 
twelve-month lim it before registration  during which bridewealth had to be paid 
in fu ll. This tim e-lim it was unenforceable in practice. Clearly, additional j
leg is la tion  was needed i f  women were to have free entry into the labour market.’
The 1912 Native Xarriages Ordinance, which was a response to the 1910 Native 
A ffa irs  Committee Report, attempted to carry out the Report's recommendation 
that child-pledging "be made crim ina lly  punishable as regards both parties  to 
such transactions”.37 In introducing the B ill, Tredgold concentrated on the 
moral aspects o f the case. He objected to the practice not only on the grounds 
provided in the Report— that is, denial of choice to the women— but also on the 
grounds that debt defaulting by the father could lead to the g ir l  being brought 
up at her husband's v illage. What i t  was exactly that the attorney-general 
considered to be so particularly horrify ing about th is poss ib ility , over and 
above the denial of choice in the f ir s t  place, is  le f t  to the imagination. 
Nonetheless, when he concluded that 'The practice  was obviously to be ‘
condemned” 3e, th is was an opinion on which the assembled gentlemen could a ll 
agree.
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provision of a fe r t ile  woman to his lineage at some later date 'when a suitable 
daughter became available for marriage. The woman would not necessarily become 
the creditor's bride. She may have been wanted as a bride fo r another man to 
whom the creditor had a responsib ility to provide a w ife.32 Either way, the 
woman's only chance of avoiding th is pre-arranged match was to run away to a 
aan whose family would be prepared to pay su ffic ien t compensation to sa tis fy  
the creditor's lineage.33
Thi6 'child-pledging' arrangement was very important in maintaining the 
s tab ility  of kinship-based class systems during times o f hardship, when drought 
or other disasters created a need for loans. Wealthy lineage heads and chiefs 
found their patronage powers reinforced by their enhanced a b ility  to provide 
brides for clients. It seems probable that increased differentiation between 
African producers during the early years of the century, as a result of 
different a b ilit ie s  to exp lo it the expanding food market, led to an increase in 
child-pledging. In 1910, the Native A ffa irs  Committee noted (with rather a 
cavalier use of the word 'money') that:
Cases have frequently  occurred in which children have been so 
pledged in order that money may be raised to discharge debts.3* (my 
emphasis)
Missionaries were appalled at th is practice, and most Europeans found i t  
distasteful.
In addition to the moral dimension, however, there were also demands that 
action be taken against child-pledging from other quarters. The Native 
Commissioners were fed up with having to deal with a steady flow of 
compensation claims regarding g ir ls  who had run away.35 Moreover, throughout 
th is period there was a stead^d^manc^|or female labour. G irls were especially 
sought as domestic w o r k e r s , E u r o p e a n  women were thought to be at risk  of 
sexual attack from black male servants. In an attempt to sa tis fy  th is demand, 
Native Commissioners proposed that the power of the family heads to dispose of 
young women in marriage should be weakened, in the hope that th is would give 
the g ir ls  the choice o f taking up waged domestic labour instead .3e The 1901 
ordinance did not e ffec tiv e ly  prevent lineage heads from pledging the g ir ls  
under their control. The nearest i t  came to this was the setting-down of the 
twelve-month lim it before registration  during which bridewealth had to be paid 
in fu ll. This tim e-lim it was unenforceable in practice. Clearly, additional 
legislation  was needed i f  women were to have free entry into the labour market.
The 1912 Native Marriages Ordinance, which was a response to the 1910 Native 
A ffa irs Committee Report, attempted to carry out the Report's recommendation 
that child-pledging "be made crim ina lly  punishable as regards both parties  to 
such transactions",37 In introducing the B ill, Tredgold concentrated on the 
moral aspects of the case. He objected to the practice not only on the grounds 
provided in the Report— that is, denial of choice to the women— but also on the 
grounds that debt defaulting by the father could lead to the g ir l  being brought 
up at her husband’s v illage . What i t  was exactly that the attorney-general 
considered to be so particu larly horrifying about this poss ib ility , over and 
above the denial o f choice in the f i r s t  place, is  le f t  to the imagination. 
Nonetheless, when he concluded that ‘The practice was obviously to  be 
condemned" 3e, th is was an opinion on which the assembled gentlemen could a ll 
agree.
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The passing of the 1912 ordinance marked the f i r s t  time in Southern Rhodesia 
that a recognised system of African marriage was not only declared ille g a l but 
also made into a criminal offence.3S> One e ffec t o f thi6 move, which was not 
raised in the debate in the Legislative Council, was to crim inalise part o f the 
African system of loans and patronage, which must have contributed to  the 
destabilising o f ch ie fly  power. It is  not clear from the reports o f the Chief 
Bative Commissioner whether the Administration was aware o f th is "s ide-e ffec t" 
of its  leg is la tion , but such a development would have been in line with o f f ic ia l 
'Bative Policy* o f the period. It  is  also interesting that Tredgold played the 
'morality* card in introducing the b i l l  to the settler-dominated Council, rather 
than pointing out the advantages in bringing African women onto the labour 
market — another "s id e-e ffec t" which would have suited the assimilation policy 
of the Administration.
Whatever the Company and Legislative Council night have hoped that the 
Ordinance would achieve, its  actual e ffe c t was to create even greater confusion 
regarding African marriage than had been the result o f the 1901 Ordinance. 
Moreover, i t  did th is without noticeably producing a decline in the practice of 
child-pledging nor an increase in the number of women presenting themselves on 
the labour market. A major source of confusion was the fact that the ordinance 
did not sp ec ifica lly  prohibit child-pledging, but imposed a penalty"10 on:
any person who is  a party to the promising or pledging of a native
female in respect of her marriage.
This e ffec tive ly  criminalised any affinaticm agreement leading to marriage, but 
a vaguely-worded exception,"except insofar as authorised by the said [19011 
Ordinance", was intended to exclude ordinary bridewealth arrangements.
Thi6 was only the s ta rt o f the problems. The ordinance did not make clear how 
anyone could te l l  when there was a child-pledging arrangement rather than a 
debt rescheduling, or an aspiration regarding a daughter’s future choice. 
Moreover, i t  was only i f  the marriage was actually registered that i t  could 
become a ’marriage* in European terms, at which point the g ir l  would be of an 
age to speak for herself, and the 'lack of consent' clause o f the 1901 Ordinance 
would be su ffic ien t to prevent the marriage. The 1912 Ordinance could hardly be 
used to prevent the match i f  the g ir l  herself wanted it , i f  only because there 
would be no reason to suppose that any earlier pledging took place. In the 
absence of registration, there was no more than cohabitation between the couple, 
about which the Ordinance was silen t. To crown a ll th is, there was an apparent 
drafting error in the Ordinance's wording, which substituted "or" fo r "either". 
The e ffec t was to imply that any arrangement which pledged a ’native female* in 
respect of 'valuable consideration', including a wages agreement, would 
constitute a criminal offence. Having picked his way through a ll these 
con fu s ion s ,M ittleb ee le r  adds that, in a case in 1916:
the judge remarked that i f  the clause in point had appeared in a
contract, he would have held i t  void for uncertainty.
Clearly, th is sloppy piece of legislation  had to go, and in 1917 it  was repealed 
along with the other Bative Marriage Ordinances on the Statute book.
The 1917 Bative Marriages Ordinance which replaced the ea rlier Ordinances 
dropped the project o f prohibiting pledging altogether. Instead i t  concentrated
on penalising attempts to enforce marriage of a pledged g ir l without her 
consent.*2 This had not previously been an offence, but simply grounds for 
disallowing a marriage. The measure was passed almost without comment. Given 
that it was grounded in a genuine paternalist concern, agreement was to be 
expected, nonetheless, it i6 indicative of the extent to which Europeans were 
now ready to criminalise African a ffa irs  that only one voice in the Council was 
raised against:
multiplying the legislation which would have the effect of further 
increasing crime.*®
This concern was echoed in the Chief Bative Commissioner’s report for that year 
which warned that:
Ve should..be careful to avoid the danger of over-legislation; our aim 
should be more in the direction of elasticity of native administ­
ration and tolerating of native customs, especially when the native 
is in the transition stage.
This cautionary note, however, was not represented in the Council by the 
Administration*6 officers, who regarded the interests of the BAD as secondary 
and slightly suspect.
The actual success of the child-pledging measure may be judged by a letter from 
the Eev. Latimer P. Hardaker of the Methodists’ Epworth Mission, appealing for 
help in the *fight for  the emancipation o f the native women'. The letter, dated 
1924, states that:
The pledging of daughters is  a practice which though illega l is  s t i l l  
widely practised...There are places within 50 miles of Salisbury... 
where there is  no g ir l  of the age of 15 or 16 who is not married, 
and that very often to a man many years her senior.**.
Even making allowances for the hyperbole of a fund-raiser, it  6eems clear that 
the 1917 Ordinance did not succeed in k illing o ff the practice of child- 
pledging.
Bonetheless, the 1917 Ordinance was a most successful piece of legislation in 
other respects. It became Chapter 79 of the consolidated edition of the colony's 
statutes, and remained effective (except in repect of the invalidity of 
unregistered marriages*6) until the passing of the Bative Marriages Act in 
1951. Its great strength lay in its ab ility  to satisfy  the various European 
interests in African marriage. It provided a definition of the 'moment' of. 
marriage which satisfied  the courts and administrators, who needed an 
identifiable 'event' when registration became necessary. This moment was fixed 
at an early point in the African marriage process, before cohabitation, thus 
satisfying missionary and paternalist concern that no marriage should be 
consummated before the woman had had the chance to express her consent at 
registration ,*e
The f ir s t  debate of the fu ll committee of the Legislative Council on the 1917 
Bative Marriages B ill is  fascinating, as the hon. members grope towards the 1 
final measure which became Chapter 79.*7 They find the task of pinning down 
the complex process of African marriage to a particular moment very taxing.
The relevant section was Section 8, which had to achieve three things. Firstly, 
it needed to satisfy  administrators by providing a definite moment at which 
registration was required, backed up by penalties for failure to register. 
Secondly, it was intended to prevent 'legalised rape', that is, consummation of a 
marriage to which the woman did not consent. Lastly, it  needed to demonstrate 
clearly that registration was designed only to ensure these f ir s t  two things, 
and was not in any way attempting to criminalise either unmarried Africans who 
'cohabited' without registration, or g ir ls  who eloped without their father’s 
permission. This third requirement for Section 8 was based bn two premisses of 
European patgmallsH: firs tly , that the State should not interfere in the private 
affa irs  of individuals i f  no other interests were involved, and secondly, that 
the State had a duty to protect the freedom of choice for young women with 
regard to their future husbands.
It was a very d ifficu lt task to seperate out those cases which were in European
eyes "special cases" from the standard marriage procedures of Africans. In the
case of cohabitation, it was usual practice^or^young people to be allowed to 5lg/i$ig
sleeja together at a very early stage of the marriage process^ Consequently it  rJAz NS/r7|
would be very d ifficu lt for a local administrator to knew who might be in the ^
early stages of marriage— and so breaking the law by not registering with fu ll u<_.
female consent before consummation— and who sight simplyJje having a/sexual . ~ cJ p 
relationship.' Admittedly such a casual liaison seemed u n lik e l^^u xtfie  ^  ^ 
possibility was thought to be enough to merit attention. Matters were further 
complicated in the Committee debate when Lionel Cripps, who represented Eastern 
district in the Council, and considered himself an expert on 'Native A ffa irs ', 
asserted that i f  an African couple slept together they were regarded as married 
by their villages, adding that "it was a good thing to legalise the native 
marriage custom".
Notwithstanding thi6 intervention, the Council stopped short of demanding that 
a ll  non-adulterous sexual relationships should he registered or risk  criminal 
prosecution. Instead, the 'moment of marriage' was defined as happening after 
fu ll bridewealth arrangements had been settled but before the marriage was 
consummated,AB In such circumstances, it  was clear that a marriage was 
involved, and not simply a sexual liaison. Consent of the woman was also  
ensured by this means. Moreover, this definition met the needs of the native 
commissioners, whose task of dealing with disputes over marriage would be made 
easier by having a record of the bridewealth agreement. Such a record would 
also ensure that any subsequent bridewealth dispute could not call into question 
the validity of the marriage, at least in European eyes.®5
The other "special case" which required clarification with respect to Section 8 
was that of elopement. The problem arose from Section 8's attempt to legislate  
against enforced marriages indirectly, through the penalty imposed on failure to 
register.®0 This penalty was extended to apply not only to the husband but also 
to the woman's father or family head. It was assumed that fathers would not 
risk the criminal penalty incurred by failure to register, and so would not try 
to force their daughters into marriages to which they would not consent at the 
inevitable registration .7 The problem with this arrangement was that in cases of 
elopement it  exposed bqth the woman’s lover and her father to the risk of 
iprosecution, since 6uch marriages would not be registered. Once again, the 
’situation was complicated by the fact that an elopement could constitute the 
firs t  stage of a marriage arrangement, to be followed by negotiations about 
| bridewealth and, where applicable, compensation payments. Clearly such a 3
3.
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sequence of events deviated from the neat arrangement regarding the 'moment of 
marriage' just agreed upon. On the other hand, it  seemed very wrong that a man 
who genuinely did sot condone his daughter's action should be penalised for 
failure to register her 'sarriage*. The honourable member© were unwilling to 
solve this dilemma by excluding the father from the penalty, as this exposed 
the woman to the risk  of forced marriage. The whole a ffa ir  wa6 most 
frustrating.
Discussion of the Ordinance was delayed by the extended debate on the question 
of amalgamation with northern Rhodesia, and did not resume until the 1st May. 
This second sitting of the Committee was characterised by much more clarity  of 
thought regarding the responslbllties of the woman's father in ensuring 
registration. It was agreed that a penalty should be imposed on the father, 
since he became entitled to bridewealth on cohabitation and therefore had a 
motive for avoiding registration where consent seemed unlikely. However, the 
entire problem of elopement could be side-stepped by a careful definition of 
terms. In a situation where a daughter was cohabiting without her father’s fu ll 
knowledge and consent, fu ll bridewealth arrangements could not have been made. 
The cohabitation did not therefore constitute a marriage within the terms of 
the Ordinance and no penalty could fa l l  on the father.*1 And so the "special 
cases" were successfully extracted from the general principle. With the passing 
of the 1917, Ordinance, the Europeans had equipped themselves with a workable 
piece of legislation with- which to mould African marriage practices into a more 
controllable and acceptable form.
However, not every member of the Legislative Council was totally  happy with the 
Ordinance. There was disquiet from several quarters over the later sections of 
the Ordinance which dealt with the consequences to Africans of choosing to be 
married according to Christian rites. The issue was not properly resolved and 
later legislation (Chapter 150 of the consolidated edition of the Colony's 
statutes) provided specifically  for Christian African marriages.62
In addition to this, doubts were raised about the whole idea of attempting to 
legislate for African marriage. Two voices in particular stand out in the 
debate. A blistering attack upon the entire legislation was delivered by John 
McChlery, the member for Marandellas, at the start of the discussion on the 
second reading. In his opinion:
If it was passed it  would have the effect oXjturaiag half the popul­
ation of the country into criminals.63'
S ir Charles Coghlan also failed to see why the Council was wasting its  time 
imposing penalties on those who did not observe the formalities connected with 
African marriage. He considered that a ll  such legislation only served to 
perpetuate and legitimise 'heathen customs', and moreover violated the sp irit  of 
the 1898 Order in Council. The Order had accepted the validity of African 
marriage practices without attempting either to lay down rules for 6uch 
practices or to use criminal sanctions to enforce them. To make such an attempt 
seemed to Coghlan to be both unwise and unnecessary.6,4 It is  noticable that 
both McChlery and Coghlan were leading members of the movement for Responsible 
Government. It was under Responsible Government that segregation was to become 
the dominant political ideology, maintaining a fiction that Africans had an 
independent culture which should be le ft  to develop in the Reserves, without 
European interference. In 1917, however, it  was clear to Coghlan, at least, that
the Administration was too deeply embroiled in the issue of 'Native Marriage' to 
avoid further legislation. Given that a clear, workable ordinance was better 
than the confusion it  replaced, the 1917 Ordinance was cautiously accepted by 
this future leader of the settler state.
Thi6 series of ordinances is  a curious mish-mash integrating a variety of 
'native policy' options. In the name of 'c iv ilis ing ' and of 'emancipating' African 
women, the Administration undertook to ensure the registration of African 
marriages. Tet this, as Coghlan complained, had the result of enshrining in 
Statute law the detailed practice of those very procedures condemned as 
'heathen' and 'barbarous' by the 'civiliBers'. Moreover, while humanists such as 
Cripps welcomed the ordinances because they appeared to affirm  the right of 
Africans to organise their marriages in their own way, the actual effect of the 
measures was to ensure that it  was the State, not the African authorities, who 
now o ffic ia lly  regulated these marriage practices. The 1917 Ordinance was, like 
the policy of segregation, a 'convenient umbrella' uniting, a lbeit shakily, the 
several interests of the European community.
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